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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY NELSON WATTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant

vs.
WAYNE D. WATTS,

Case No.
12097

Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant commenced an action in the lower court for
separate maintenance and the respondent filed a counterclaim for a divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded a divorce to the respondent
on his counterclaim and awarded the custody of the minor
child, Jonnie Watts, to the respondent and the custody of
the minor child, Linda Watts, to the appellant. The respondent was ordered to pay $75.00 per month child support for
the minor child, Linda Watts, and to pay $200.00 per month
alimony to the appellant provided, however, that said alimony was to be reduced on January 1, 1972, in accordance
with the circumstances then existing. The court awarded the
appellant the possession of the parties' home during her lifetime or until she should remarry, at which time said home
was to be sold and the net proceeds of the sale divided 65
percent to the appellant and 35 percent to the respondent. Each
party was ordered to pay one-half of the general taxes due upon
said property. The appellant was awarded a Mustang automo1

bile and the respondent was awarded an International truck
and a car being used by his son. The other property of the
parties was awarded to the party having possession.
The appellant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to amend the judgment based on a supporting affidavit.
The lower court denied both motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's denial of
the appellant's motions and requests a new trial or a setting
aside of the divorce judgment and an opening of the judgment for the purpose of taking additional testimony and
amending the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complaint for separate maintenance was filed by the
plaintiff-appellant, Mary Nelson Watts, on July 14, 1967, in
the District Court of Weber County. On the 7th day of July,
1969, the defendant-respondent, Wayne D. Watts, filed an
answer and a counterclaim for a divorce. On the 3rd day of
December, 1969, the appellant filed an answer to the respondent's counterclaim and a motion to vacate trial date and
order for appointment of marriage counselor. A trial on the
issues was held on the 15th day of December, 1969, at which
time the district court dismissed the separate maintenance
action of the appellant and tried the case on the counterclaim
of the respondent. Both the appellant and respondent togeth·
er with their respective attorneys were present at the trial
and presented testimony as to physical abuse and mental cruelty on the part of both parties. Testimony was also presented
concerning the income and the property of the parties.
The evidence produced at the trial estabilshed that the
parties had two motor vehicles (T-10, 38, 39), life insurance
2

(T-10, 11, 16), miscellaneous furniture (T-10) and a home
valued between $22,500.00 and $30,000.00 (T-17, 37). Testimony was also given concerning the income of the respondent. (T-28, 29, 43, 46) The respondent testified at the trial
that his net income amounted to $514.57 per month and that
his income increased during the latter part of the year to
approximately $538.00. He also stated that $200.00 per month
was deducted from his income and paid to the credit union.
(T-28, 29) On another occasion during the trial the respondent testified that he received $520.00 per month for the first
half of the year and $582.00 per month for the second half
of the year. (T-43) On cross examination the respondent admitted that the $200.00 per month which he had previously
testified was paid into the credit union was, in fact, being
used by him for living expenses. The respondent also testified that he had nothing to show for his earnings except the
income and property set out above. (T-39)
Both the appellant and respondent testified concerning
the appellant's ability to work. The appellant testified that
she was not physically able to work because of medical reasons. (T-19) The respondent testified that the appellant was
capable of working in spite of her physical condition. (T-29,
30, 31, 48, 49) The appellant's attorney, Mr. Hendricks, at
tempted to offer into evidence a letter from the appellant's
doctor concerning her physical ability to work. (T-51)
On the 27th day of February, 1970, the court signed a
divorce decree. The provisions of that decree are specifically
set out in this brief under Disposition in the Lower Court.
On March 9, 1970, a motion for a new trial or in the alternative to amend the judgment was filed with the lower
court supported by an affidavit of the appellant. The motion
was based upon the fact that the respondent had misrepresented facts to the court concerning his income, property and
3

his wife's health. The motion and affidavit also alleged that
the attorney who represented the appellant in the trial had
failed to present evidence on her behalf in relationship to
her husband's income, property and the appellant's physical
ability to work. On April 1, 1970, the argument on the appellant's motion was heard by the lower court. The appellant's
counsel enumerated the points set out in his motion. (T-5560) The respondent's counsel stated that the defendant had
not misrepresented the facts to the court and that the respondent had testified at the trial that he made $532.00 every two weeks instead of every month. The respondent also
said this was correct. (T-62, 63) The respondent's counsel also
admitted that his client had an interest in a profit sharing
program in connection with his employment. (T-63)
The appellant based her motion on Rules 59(a) and 60(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (T-60, 61) On April 7, 1970,
the court denied the appellant's motion and on May 11, 1970,
the appellant filed an appeal to the Utah State Supreme Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The respondent presented incorrect and inconsistent information to the trial court concerning his income and his
property. Because of a misunderstanding on the part of the
appellant's attorney the appellant was prevented from presenting correct information to the court concerning the respondent's interest in a profit sharing program, the respondent's correct income and the appellant's physical health and
ability to work. The trial court did not receive a full and correct disclosure of all of the facts in this case and, therefore,
was in error in not granting the appellant's motion for a new
trial or setting aside the judgment and taking additional testimony so that the court could be fully informed before making a final decision concerning the interests and rights of the
parties.
4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE TO OPEN THE JUDGMENT AND
ACCEPT ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY BY REASON OF
THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THE RESPONDENT MISREPRESENTED
AND FAILED TO FULLY REPRESENT THE CORRECT
AMOUNT OF HIS INCOME AND PROPERTY.
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly states
that a new trial can be granted or the court can open the
judgment and take additional testimony when there is irregularity in the proceedings of the court or of an adverse party
or when the evidence produced at the trial is insufficient to
justify the verdict or decision of the court. Rule 60(b) (3)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may
relieve a party from a final judgment when there has been
misrepresentation or other misconduct on the part of the adverse party. Section 7 of 60(b) states that a judgment can be
set aside for any other reason justifying relief.
It is the appellant's contention that the respondent was

guilty of misconduct justifying a new trial or the taking of
additional testimony. Throughout the trial the respondent was
asked concerning his property. He never once mentioned that
he had a very large and substantial amount of money held
in a profit sharing program in connection with his employment. In fact, on one occasion the respondent specifically
indicated that he had no property other than a home, motor
vehicles, miscellaneous furniture and personal effects. The
respondent was asked, "Other than these assets do you have
.
?" H
anything to show for your earnmgs.
e answere d, "No"
.
(T-39) Later during the trial on cross examination the respon·
dent was asked if he had any severance pay or anything from
5

his job other than the income he had testified to. The respondent replied, "No." (T-46) The respondent's counsel in arguing against the appellant's motion for a new trial admitted
that the respondent participated in a profit-sharing program
but alleged that it was not worth $30,000.00. (T-63)
The testimony of the respondent in regard to his income
is also inconsistent and misleading. When first asked about
his income the respondent stated that he made $514.57 per
month and that his income increased during the latter part of
the year to approximately $538.00 per month. (T-28) The
court specifically asked the respondent, "Would that be for
a month?" The respondent replied, 'Yes." (T-29) The respondent also testified that $200.00 per month was taken from his
income for the purpose of paying an indebtedness to the credit union. (T-29) However, on another ocasion during the trial
the respondent testified that the $200.00 per month was being used by him for living expenses. (T-46) Later in the trial
the respondent testified that he received $520.00 per month
for the first half of the year and $582.00 per month for the
second half of the year. (T-43) However, during the argument had on the appellant's motion for a new trial the respondent's counsel stated:
"And what Mr. Echard has represented to the court
is just not true.
"Let me take the first point: There was a check stub
introduced in evidence, and it should be in the file,
which was Mr. Watts' current check showing the deductions and the amount of his pay. So, Your Honor was informed. And the pay was $532.00 take-home
pay every two weeks; Is that correct?
"MR. WATTS: That was the total, actually, for a twoweek period."

*

*

*

"So, the fact that he testified that he was only mak6

ing $532.00 per month is just not true." (T-62, 63)
The exhibits introduced by the respondent indicated that
on January 8, 1969 the respondent received a gross pay of
$461.54 with a net pay of $243.88 after $100.00 had been paid
to the credit union. On January 22, 1969, the respondent received a gross pay of $473.08 with a net pay of $270.60 after $100.00 was deducted for the credit union. Two other
exhibits were introduced on behalf of the respondent, one
of them showing a gross pay of $484.00 with a net pay of
$301.09 with $100.00 going to the credit union on October
25, 1969. The other exhibit was dated November 8, 1969,
and showed a gross pay of $484.60 with a net pay of $281.29
with $100.00 going to the credit union. From the exhibits presented by the respondent and the inconsistent testimony of
the respondent regarding his income it is not possible to accurately determine how much the respondent makes per year.
If the net income figures presented by the respondent at the
trial are accepted then the respondent would be making approximately $7,600 per year as a net take-home pay. However,
if the respondent, in fact, is using the $200.00 per month
which the exhibits reflect is being withheld by the credit
union then his net income per year would be increased by
by $2,400.00 making the net income $10,000 per year.
If the respondent's statement made during the argu-

ment of the motion for new trial is accepted as being true
then the respondent would be making a net income of approximately $12,700.00 per year.

The appellant contends that the respondent, in fact, is
making in excess of $12,000.00 per year and that this can
be substantiated by his income tax returns. (T-56, 57)
The respondent had an obligation to fully disclose to
the court any and all property and income he had. This principle is clearly set out in Smith vs. Smith 77 U. 60 291 p.298
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(1930) where the court stated,
"In order for the court to make an equitable division
of property of the parties, or which is the same thing,
to allow to the wife her permanent alimony, it was
the duty of both parties to fully disclose to the court
just what their condition was as to property ... "
This court on a number of occasions has pointed out that
in making a property settlement and in awarding alimony
it is necessary for the court to consider among other things
the type and amount of property owned by each party, the
source of said property and income, the financial needs of
each party, the health of each party and the ability of each
party to earn money. Pinion vs Pinion 92 U. 255 67 P.2d
265 (1937), Wilson vs Wilson 5 U. 2d 79 296 P.2d 977 (1956),
Anderson vs Anderson 18 U. 2d 286 422 P.2d 192 (1967).
Therefore, it is the appellant's contention that in light of the
conflicting testimony given by the respondent in relationship
to his property and to his income, it was error for the court
to refuse to set aside the judgment and take additional testimony from the parties. Since the respondent did not fully
disclose the extent of his property and income the trial court
was without sufficient information to make a fair and equitable division of the property.
Apparently the court accepted the respondent's representation of his financial status and ability. This is indicated by
the fact that the court's judgment is substantially the same
as the respondent's recommendations. The respondent was
asked what he thought his wife should receive. He replied
that he thought his wife should have the Mustang automobile and one half of the house. He also said that he was willing to pay his wife $200.00 per month. (T-43) Had the court
been aware of the misrepresentations that were made by the
respondent it is doubtful that it would have placed so much
reliance on the respondent's recommendations.
8

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE TO OPEN THE JUDGMENT AND
ACCEPT ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY BY REASON OF
THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY
DID NOT PRESENT ALL OF THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE APPELLANT'S PHYSICAL HEALTH AND THE RESPONDENT'S INCOME
AND PROPERTY.
Prior to and throughout the trial the appellant informed her attorney, John Hendricks, that her husband had an
interest in a profit sharing program in connection with his
work valued at approximately $30,000.00. However, Mr. Hendricks did not present this information to the court nor cross
examine the respondent concerning it. Instead, Mr. Hendricks indicated to his client, the appellant, that he did not
understand profit sharing programs and, consequently, he
was not going to ask the respondent about it. (T-66) The appellant also informed Mr. Hendricks that the respondent was
making more money than he represented to the court. However, her attorney apparently misunderstood her or failed
to understand the information and, consequently, did not
present said information to the court. One of the important
issues raised at the trial concerned the appellant's physical
health and her ability to maintain a job. None of this information was presented to the court by the appellant's attorney. On one occasion the appellant's attorney attempted to
offer into evidence a letter from the appellant's doctor. However, the letter was objected to and the court did not receive
it into evidence.
This court has generally held that a client is bound by
the actions of his attorney and that an erroneous judgment
will not be overturned on the sole grounds of the negligence
of the attorney. However, this court has also indicated that
9

1
under Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a judgment
can be vacated when an erroneous judgment has been entered because of procedural difficulty, the wrongs of the opposing party or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of
a claim or a defense. Warren vs Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416,
260 P.2d 741, 744 (1953).
This court has always held that a divorce was an action in equity and that the full disclosure of all of the evidence should be obtained whenever possible. Wilson vs Wilson, 5 U. 2d 79 296 P.2d 977 (1956) It is the appellant's contention that all of the evidence was not obtained at the trial
court level because of the apparent misunderstanding on the
part of her attorney and because of the misrepresentations
and misconduct of the respondent. This court has generally
held that it would not reverse the decision of the trial court
in granting or denying a new trial unless an abuse of discretion was shown. It is the appellant's contention that while
the actions of the appellant's attorney alone would not be
sufficient grounds to grant a new trial, it along with the mis·
conduct and misrepresentations of the respondent is enough
to require that the appellant be given an opportunity for a
new trial or to present further testimony so that the full
truth can be presented before a trial court for its decision.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court errored

in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial or in the
alternative to amend the judgment. The decision of the trial
court should be reversed and the case should be remanded
for a new trial or to amend the judgment and take additional
testimony.
ROBERT A. ECHARD
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah

Attorney for Appellant
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